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The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), notorious for com-mitting horrific atrocities against civilians in northern Uganda, presents a puzzle. !e LRA systematically ab-
ducted girls and forcibly married them to the rebel commanders 
and soldiers. Yet rape outside of these marriages was rare, and gang 
rape of civilians was noticeably absent from the LRA’s repertoire of 
violence. Why did this seemingly incongruous pattern of violence 
develop? Is this behavior truly as surprising as it appears?
Variation in wartime sexual violence, both within and across 
conflicts, has been recognized in the past decade. Recent research 
has focused on documenting this heterogeneity and analyzing its 
patterns, yet sexual violence during the LRA’s twenty-year insur-
gency—its form and its causes—has not been adequately studied. 
!e case merits attention because it introduces a curious challenge 
to existing explanations of sexual violence during war. Moreover, 
as one of Africa’s longest lasting and largest insurgencies, the LRA 
continues to destabilize the Great Lakes region. For that reason, 
defeating this armed group is a security imperative for several east 
African nations, as well as a foreign policy objective of the United 
States. 
!e premise of my argument is that di"erent forms of sexu-
al violence have varying purposes, and there is a logic behind the 
rebels’ repertoire of violence. Accordingly, this paper will pose two 
questions. First, why did the LRA practice forced marriage and 
how was the LRA’s agenda advanced by arranging such relation-
ships? Second, why did the LRA not commit more rape outside 
12 /VEQIV)\TPEMRMRK7I\YEP:MSPIRGIF]XLI06%
of forced marriage than was observed? It is counter-intuitive to 
grossly violate women’s rights in one context while institutionaliz-
ing restraint from sexual violence in another. !e literature on war-
time sexual violence would indeed predict widespread gang rape of 
civilians by the LRA. However, empirical evidence contradicts this 
theory. How can we understand this unexpected rebel behavior?
!rough the use of secondary data analysis, I contend that 
the LRA’s observed patterns of sexual violence result largely from 
its operating in an environment with few material resources and 
lack of popular support for an army composed almost entirely of 
abducted youth. Forced marriage helped maintain the army under 
these circumstances. Wives were distributed as compensation and 
status markers for soldiers in the absence of material goods, and 
families were fabricated to create networks of interdependency 
among the combatants. !e LRA leadership prohibited rape out-
side of marriage, because the practice was not instrumental to the 
rebels’ success. Controlling sexual violence reflects not only cultural 
norms against rape but also the leadership’s need to exert control 
over its army of forcibly recruited soldiers. Brutal nonsexual forms 
of violence were promoted instead of gang rape to induce cohesion 
and loyalty among abductees. In contrast to the claim that gang 
rape best unites a group of abducted soldiers, the LRA’s ferocious, 
nonsexual violence was successful at increasing the rebels’ e"cacy 
while avoiding the cultural and practical complications of extra-
marital rape.
!is paper examines the practices of sexual violence em-
ployed by the LRA during its rebellion in northern Uganda and 
analyzes the functional purpose of its violence. I first define the 
terms used in my analysis, followed by a review of the literature on 
sexual violence during war that attempts to decipher what existing 
theorists on sexual violence would expect to observe in the case of 
the LRA. Following an overview of the conflict in northern Uganda 
and the LRA, I describe the LRA’s repertoire of violence, specifi-
cally sexual violence, and explain why forced marriages were perva-
sive in the army. I then discuss current theories that predict that the 
LRA would practice less controlled sexual violence and perpetrate 
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more gang rape of civilians than was observed. In response, I pro-
pose why the LRA deviates from these models. I conclude with a 
discussion of the implications of this analysis and areas for further 
research.
DEFINITIONS
Sexual violence is a broad grouping of o!enses; the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) defines it as an act of a sexual nature 
committed by force or coercion, the gravity of which is “comparable 
to that of a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.”1 "e Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda adds, “Sexual violence is 
not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may in-
clude acts which do not involve penetration or even physical con-
tact.”2 "e ICC enumerates several types of sexual violence, and 
though forced marriage has not been explicitly recognized among 
these examples, it qualifies as sexual violence according to the afore-
mentioned definitions.3 "erefore, the act of forced marriage can 
be subsumed under the category of sexual violence. 
Rape also falls under the umbrella of sexual violence and is 
defined as “the coerced (under physical force or threat of physical 
force against the victim or a third person) penetration of the anus 
or vagina by the penis or another object, or of the mouth by the 
penis.”4 Acts of rape take many forms, and it is necessary to distin-
guish those that pertain to this analysis. Rape within forced mar-
riage refers to non-consensual sexual acts between a captor hus-
band and his abducted wife. Rape outside of forced marriage (or 
extra-marital rape) is the rape of a forced wife by someone other 
than her husband, or the rape of non-forcibly married women—
both abductees and civilians. Gang rape is any crime of rape perpe-
trated by a group of people.
FRAMING THE CASE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE LITERATURE
For the past decade, social science literature has recognized 
the heterogeneity of wartime sexual violence practices. Elisabeth 
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Wood illustrates that conflicts (and by extension, actors within 
conflicts) may di!er in the extent to which they utilize sexual vio-
lence and the form in which it occurs.5 Still, numerous traditional 
interpretations of sexual violence fail to account for the observed 
variation.6 For example, neither the type of conflict nor theories 
about increased opportunity for sexual aggression during war ex-
plain the diversity of sexually based crimes perpetrated in times of 
conflict. Explanations that focus on the breakdown of state and of 
patriarchy have also proven to be inadequate in this respect. Many 
scholars have, therefore, turned to di!erences in internal socializa-
tion and discipline practices to explain this variation. 
Wood holds that leaders of an armed force may attempt to 
restrain sexual violence for various normative, practical or strategic 
reasons. 7 If the leadership hierarchy is su"ciently strong, com-
manders will be able to successfully enforce these norms among 
their troops and curb sexual violence. In a similar vein, Ame-
lia Hoover Green argues that “controlled violence,” 8 or “violence 
with a relatively narrow, consistent repertoire,”9 is observed when 
commanders institutionalize political programs that induce sol-
diers to internalize the leaders’ preferences for narrow repertoires. 
Hoover Green emphasizes the absence of sexual violence as an 
important indicator of such internalization. She also posits that 
external incentives and disincentives—in other words, disciplin-
ary mechanisms—are insu"cient for enforcing control. Hoover 
Green proves her theory and determines what factors contribute to 
varying repertoires of violence using qualitative and statistical data 
about armed groups engaged in El Salvador’s civil war in the 1980s. 
#ough the LRA committed an array of crimes against ci-
vilians, the scope of its sexual crimes was nonetheless heavily re-
stricted. In light of the LRA’s limited repertoire of sexual violence, 
Hoover Green would expect the presence of strong institutions 
for political education that regulate violence. In addition, Hoover 
Green holds that such institutions are established when a com-
mander has incentives to control his soldiers’ behavior, such as 
when the group depends on non-combatants for information. She 
would therefore predict that incentives for limiting violence, such 
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as the need to extract information from civilians, existed for the 
LRA, and that the leadership promoted political institutions that 
control violence. As we will see, however, applying Hoover Green’s 
theory to the case of the LRA fails when empirical evidence is tak-
en into consideration.
Dara Kay Cohen addresses the flip side of Hoover Green’s ar-
gument and asks when armed groups encourage, or at least permit, 
sexual violence. Cohen suggests that gang rape is perpetrated as a 
response to an army’s problem of intragroup social dynamics.10 
Armed groups with little internal cohesion, in particular those that 
rely on forced recruitment, use gang rape to forge a coherent unit. 
Given that the LRA is made almost entirely of abducted children, 
Cohen’s theory predicts combatants will perpetrate high levels of 
gang rape in order to promote unity and loyalty among the group. 
However, this prediction does not hold true for the LRA. 
Dara Kay Cohen has coded global levels of wartime rape, and 
though the Ugandan conflict is included in her dataset, it is not 
helpful for assessing levels of LRA gang rape or rape outside of 
marriage. Cohen analyzes total wartime rape by country, and so it 
is di!cult to isolate the magnitude of rapes committed by the LRA 
when groups as diverse as the Ugandan state army, Holy Spirit 
Movement, West Nile Bank Front, and Karamajong warriors are 
also under consideration.11 In addition, the sources for Cohen’s 
dataset—U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports and Am-
nesty International—do not focus on levels of gang rape specifi-
cally.12 "ey write of rape and sexual violence in broad terms and 
do not su!ciently di#erentiate between types of sexual violence.
"e LRA’s practices of sexual violence are most directly ex-
amined by Khristopher Carlson and Dyan Mazurana. Based on 
interviews with abducted girls and other informants, they describe 
the nature of forced marriage and analyze why it is experientially 
and legally di#erent than sexual slavery, with which forced marriage 
is often considered synonymous.13 "ey demonstrate that forced 
marriage persisted within the LRA because it was organized by 
the top leadership in order to increase the rebels’ e#ectiveness. I 
will draw substantially from this theory. Yet there is a gap in their 
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argument, as they do not consider the surprising absence of ex-
tra-marital rape by the LRA. !is paper will thus fill a void in the 
current literature by addressing a question that has not yet been 
posed: why did the LRA’s repertoire of sexual violence develop in 
its observed form?
BACKGROUND
!e LRA has orchestrated one of Africa’s most expansive and 
protracted insurgencies. Originating in northern Uganda in the 
late 1980s, the rebellion survived for two decades before vacating 
Uganda and spreading its violence to three neighboring countries. 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, 
and South Sudan, the LRA continues to terrorize populations, 
exacerbate existing conflicts, and destabilize the Great Lakes Re-
gion. Quelling this insurgency thus remains a regional necessity, 
though the state capacity and will to do so is weak. Capturing the 
LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony, and subduing the rebellion has also 
been a longstanding fixture of the United States’ foreign policy 
agenda—an objective that has recently been renewed under Presi-
dent Obama.14 
An additional reason to study the LRA is the geopolitical 
situation from which it originated. Uganda has been mired in po-
litical turmoil since gaining independence in 1956, and these ten-
sions have frequently evoked regional and ethnic divisions. !e 
north-south divide in particular “has at times been ethnicized . . . in 
the service of certain political agendas.”15 Milton Obote, the first 
head of state, ruled Uganda for twenty-one years, though his reign 
was interrupted for eight years by Idi Amin’s dictatorship. Obote 
was a member of northern Uganda’s Lango tribe, and his leader-
ship was challenged by a guerilla campaign objecting to perceived 
northern domination.16 !is military o"ensive, directed by Yuweri 
Museveni and supported by the country’s southern regions, formed 
the National Resistance Army (NRA) to fight the state army, the 
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). In 1985, the NRA 
marched on the capitol and Museveni ascended to power.17 
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Following its military and political victory, the NRA seized 
control of Uganda’s Acholi region and persecuted its residents; 
“rape and other forms of physical abuse aimed at non-combatants 
became the order of the day.”18 In response to this violence and 
northern resentment of Museveni (a southern president), a resis-
tance movement was born. Many former UNLA soldiers—which 
had been dominated by northerners from the Lango and Acholi 
tribes—regrouped to establish the Ugandan People’s Democratic 
Army (UPDA), and a spiritual movement emerged under the 
guidance of Alice Auma, an Acholi woman believed to be possessed 
by the spirit Lakwena.19
Lakwena initially responded to the war-torn society by con-
ducting healing rituals for UNLA soldiers retreating from Kam-
pala and by explaining the war and UNLA defeat in “a discourse of 
spiritual cleansing” that had widespread appeal.20 !e cult evolved 
into the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) as Lakwena built a follow-
ing of former UNLA soldiers. !ese men battled the NRA under 
Lakwena’s spiritual protection; she performed rituals that included 
blessing the soldiers with oil, and assured them they would be pro-
tected from bullets if they lived according to a set of rules, such as 
abstaining from sex and alcohol.21 !e HSM was defeated in 1987 
as it marched south toward Kampala.22 !ough short-lived in the 
context of the long northern campaign against Museveni’s govern-
ment, Alice Auma’s movement is important in the LRA’s history, as 
there are striking continuities between the groups. 
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY
A peace agreement was signed in 1988 between Museveni’s 
government and the UPDA. Most UPDA troops surrendered to 
the government, but many sought new outlets for continuing their 
resistance.23 Some joined a group led by Joseph Kony, which came 
to be known as the Lord’s Resistance Army. !e LRA was the 
third incarnation of the post-1986 insurgencies, and it ultimately 
had the longest lifespan. It asserted control in northern Uganda 
for two decades in the midst of numerous failed peace negotiations 
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and multi-national counter-insurgency operations. To some extent, 
the LRA initially prevailed in Uganda by default, and by 1990, it 
was the only significant military presence remaining.24 Kony’s 
group developed at the same time in competition with the HSM. 
It benefited tremendously from both the HSM’s demise and the 
disintegration of the UPDA. !e LRA absorbed many elements of 
these antecedent organizations: the HSM’s spiritual drive and the 
UPDA’s political objectives and troops.25 !ough this character-
ization is simplistic, it points to two central elements of the LRA 
ideology that are often characterized in tension.
Like its predecessors, the LRA’s objective was the overthrow 
of the Ugandan government. !e rebels conducted information 
campaigns, held political rallies, and even declared a ceasefire dur-
ing the 1996 presidential elections to facilitate voting for the oppo-
sition candidate.26 !e LRA’s goals were explicitly communicated 
in political manifestos circulated in the region, many of which also 
asserted the LRA’s support for the protection of human rights.27 
!ere is thus a clear discrepancy between the group’s written agen-
da and the reality experienced on the ground, as the LRA’s insur-
gency is characterized predominantly by its targeting of civilians 
and its gross human rights violations. 
Also central to the LRA’s ideology was a strong spiritual be-
lief system, similar to Lakwena’s movement. Allegedly possessed by 
spirits, Joseph Kony injected numerous rules into the LRA’s opera-
tions and established “a puritanical code of conduct that governed 
all aspects of behavior.”28 Drugs and alcohol were prohibited, and 
sex was permissible only within the sanctioned marriages arranged 
by LRA commanders.29 Obeying these rules was considered nec-
essary for survival. Soldiers were taught that those who complied 
were impervious to death during battle, while those who disobeyed 
would be killed in combat.30 !is spiritualism and its associated 
requirements were embedded in local cultures and traditions, but 
they also had a powerful function for the LRA, which will be elabo-
rated upon later in this paper.31 
!e spiritual dimension of the LRA and its political agen-
da have often been presented in tension. A common perception 
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emerged of Kony as a religious lunatic who guides the LRA with-
out political or social convictions and induces his soldiers to com-
mit savage acts of violence without purpose.32 However, recent 
literature on the LRA has strived to reconcile the group’s politi-
cal and spiritual elements, rather than casting the former aside.33 
New analyses present a more nuanced understanding of the LRA’s 
spiritual order and shed light on the political ideology of the orga-
nization and the “strategic rationality” of its violence.34 !e em-
ployment of spiritual rhetoric and ruthless violence are not incom-
patible with the group’s political goals. In fact, this paper argues 
that the LRA’s spiritualism and barbaric actions, including particu-
lar types of sexual violence, were purposeful and strategic.
!e LRA’s strategic vision was created and operationalized 
through a strong, hierarchical structure. Joseph Kony was the LRA’s 
founder, general, ideological commander, and spiritual leader. His 
“direct involvement with the objectives and strategies”35 of many 
attacks on civilians has been demonstrated, and he is charged with 
having “committed, ordered or induced the commission of sever-
al crimes within the jurisdiction of the [International Criminal] 
Court.”36 Kony, his second-in-command Vincent Otti, and other 
high-ranking LRA commanders constituted Control Altar—the 
group of rebel leaders who formulated and executed LRA strat-
egy.37 A clear hierarchy of command then oversaw the army’s four 
brigades, which were broken into smaller battalions that yielded 
field units of fifteen to twenty soldiers, the operational unit of the 
organization.38 !e LRA operated from bases on the Sudanese 
side of the Ugandan border, and the self-su"cient field units were 
dispatched to northern Uganda to wage the LRA’s guerrilla cam-
paign.39 All units communicated through radio and cell phones, 
which allowed them to coordinate attacks and travel together be-
tween the Sudanese bases and the Ugandan bush.40 
!e LRA’s decision to establish its bases in southern Sudan 
reflected the political and economic environment in which it oper-
ated. !ere were few natural resources to finance the LRA, and 
so they depended on financial assistance from the Sudanese gov-
ernment. !e LRA’s poverty was compounded by its alienation 
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from the public, in contrast to the previous resistance movements 
of the UPDA and Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement.41 !e LRA 
had no popular support in the region, despite pervasive opposition 
to Museveni’s government among the Acholi. !is estrangement 
was partially a result of the rebels’ violence against civilians. As one 
woman said, “I would like to support the rebels, but they are kill-
ing my people.”42 !is causal relationship also operated in reverse; 
the public’s alienation from the rebels reinforced the LRA’s incen-
tive to attack civilians.43 In addition, Sudan’s financial support of 
the LRA was critical in perpetuating the acrimonious relationship 
between the rebels and the people of northern Uganda. Not only 
did Sudan’s financing the LRA increase the viability of its operat-
ing without wealth of its own, but it also reduced the rebels’ incen-
tive to win the public’s endorsement.44 It is in this context that 
one must understand the extraordinary violence perpetrated by the 
LRA. 
Uganda’s referral of its situation to the International Crimi-
nal Court in 2003 and the subsequent issuing of arrest warrants 
was essential to the onset of concerted negotiations in Juba, Sudan 
in 2006. !ough Kony did not sign the peace agreement, it was 
during this period that LRA violence in Uganda ceased and the 
epicenter of its activities shifted to neighboring DRC, CAR, and 
what was then known as southern Sudan. Although peace has been 
established in Uganda, the LRA war has not been terminated, but 
merely exported.45
Patterns of LRA Violence
!e LRA attacked villages, killed and mutilated civilians, 
and looted their homes. !ey abducted young boys and girls, 
compelled them to kill their families, friends, and neighbors, and 
forced them to join the rebels as soldiers, porters, and wives. It is 
notable that soldiers forcibly recruited at a young age constituted 
the overwhelming majority of the LRA’s forces. As the ICC stat-
ed, “!e LRA has engaged in a cycle of violence and established 
a pattern of “brutalization of civilians” by acts including murder, 
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abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burn-
ings of houses and looting of camp settlements.”46 !e range of 
crimes perpetrated was horrifying; to adopt the vocabulary used 
by Wood, the LRA’s repertoire of violence was relatively wide.47 
Nonetheless, violence by the LRA’s combatants was highly regu-
lated and circumscribed. Crimes outside this prescribed range were 
rarely observed, and within the subset of sexual crimes, the LRA’s 
repertoire was exceptionally narrow, consisting almost exclusively 
of forced marriage. 
LRA attacks on villages were frequent and the level of violence 
was high, regardless of how this measure is assessed. Compared to 
the NRA, as well as earlier resistance movements in the region, the 
LRA perpetrated remarkably more violence. !e absolute number 
of crimes committed conveys the high levels of violence. Between 
1987 and 2006, nearly two million people were displaced and thou-
sands were murdered.48 One in three male adolescents in northern 
Uganda was abducted, as were one in six females.49 
In addition to frequency, Wood distinguishes violence based 
on targeting and purpose.50 !e LRA engaged in collective tar-
geting, as opposed to indiscriminate (random) violence or selec-
tive violence due to an individual’s behavior. Wood defines collec-
tive targeting as targeting “of social groups because of their identity 
as members of that group.” 51 !e rebels’ actions were nominally 
aimed at government collaborators, but in practice they directed 
their violence at the broader Acholi and Langi population in north-
ern Uganda. Furthermore, this violence was strategic; it was exe-
cuted at the behest of LRA commanders rather than for individual, 
private reasons.
Explaining Violence Against Civilians 
!ere are several persuasive explanations for the LRA’s pur-
poseful, extensive, and violent targeting of Acholi civilians. One 
plausible theory is that Kony strived to purge Acholi society of per-
ceived impurities. Abducting children, for example, was considered 
a means of rescuing them from a tainted world order.52 Kony was 
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particularly focused on the impurities of the NRA and cleansing 
Acholi society of its collaborators. Kony fabricated a division be-
tween the “genuine Acholi”53 who supported his campaign and “the 
corrupt, false Acholi”54 allied with the NRA, and he intended to 
rid the region of the “political corruption . . . of the NRA/M, em-
bodied in its Acholi agents.”55 By aligning portions of Acholi soci-
ety with the NRA and Museveni’s government, Kony linked them 
with southern Uganda and thus relegated them to out-group sta-
tus. Branch writes, “Since violence was being used against supposed 
foreigners, it could take on a relatively unrestrained character.”56 
!e LRA also targeted civilians as punishment, which was in-
flicted for three reasons: vengeance, deterrence, and incapacitation. 
First, increases in LRA violence were repeatedly observed follow-
ing signs of civilian opposition. Civil defense militias to combat the 
LRA were established in 1991 and 1992 with the support of the 
government, which caused Kony to feel betrayed.57 It was at this 
moment that brutal LRA violence against non-combatants initially 
escalated.58 LRA strategy shifted from directly fighting the NRA 
to seeking revenge on the civilian population. !is pattern suggests 
violence was perpetrated not only with the intent of vengeance but 
also to deter civilians from organizing in self-defense and resisting 
the LRA. Spikes in rebel violence were also seen in the aftermath 
of large counter-insurgency operations. Operation Iron Fist, car-
ried out by the Ugandan government in 2002 with support from 
the United States and Sudan, was expected to cripple the LRA, 
but the result was devastating for civilians. Violence against non-
combatants soared, and the LRA extended its reach in northern 
Uganda to unprecedented levels.59 
!ere was a set of practical motivations for violently targeting 
civilians as well. First, it prevented civilians from reporting LRA 
movements and other intelligence to the government. Second, 
by triggering mass displacements of communities, violence facili-
tated the looting of abandoned villages.60 !ird, the LRA’s exten-
sive violence against civilians undermined Museveni’s regime and 
decreased northern support for the government by revealing the 
state’s failure to protect its people.61 Fourth, abduction of youth 
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satisfied a critical, logistical need: building an army of troops. In an 
environment with minimal voluntary enlistment in the army, forc-
ibly recruiting soldiers among the youth population was necessary 
for the LRA’s survival. Challenging the NRA with an army of child 
soldiers also created a problem for the government. During a con-
frontation, it was impossible to di!erentiate LRA rebels from chil-
dren, and so the state was left in a no-win situation. Based on the 
same logic, civilians were also more reluctant to attack the LRA.62 
Persecuting the population with brutal forms of violence also 
benefited the LRA, because fear operates as a force multiplier.63 
"e LRA created a climate of terror by committing conspicu-
ous acts of violence, such as cutting o! arms, legs, ears, and lips, 
promoting the image of an omnipotent, indestructible army, and 
maximizing the traditional guerilla tactics of surprise and unpre-
dictability. Constructing an ethos of fear ultimately contributed to 
the LRA’s success fending o! the NRA in a fundamentally asym-
metric war that pitted the fragile LRA against the stronger state 
apparatus.64 
Sexual Violence in the LRA: Patterns of Forced Marriage
"e LRA’s repertoire of sexual violence in northern Uganda 
was strikingly narrow; it solely comprised forced marriage. "e 
LRA abducted boys to train them for combat, while girls were em-
ployed in numerous and complex roles, and were primarily put to 
work as cooks, porters, and wives. 65 Married girls were not only 
raped, but also subjected to forced labor and made to perpetrate 
violence. Data on patterns of LRA violence are not reliable, as they 
are based on small and biased samples. Nevertheless, approximate-
ly half of abducted females are estimated to have been the forced 
wives of LRA soldiers and commanders.66
Many fail to distinguish the critical di!erences between 
forced marriage and sexual slavery, as both are non-consensual rela-
tionships.67 Despite not being recognized by customary, Ugandan, 
or international law, these marriages were intended to be experien-
tially akin to a formal marriage:
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!ey have the traditional characteristics of shared domicile, 
bearing of children, domestic responsibilities, exclusivity and 
sex. !e nature of the relationships forces women and girls to 
take on roles as sexual partners, mothers to the children born 
from these relationships, cooks, domestics, water collectors, por-
ters, food producers, and gatherers.  !e relationships consist of 
a familial aspect where children are born and raised by abducted 
mothers and their captor husbands.68 
!e crime of forced marriage thus comprises elements not 
captured by sexual enslavement, namely its conjugal and exclusive 
dimensions. For these reasons, Carlson and Mazurana argue forced 
marriage is both a sexual and non-sexual gender-based crime. !is 
point is not meant to belittle the sexual violence that transpired 
within these marriages. Sexual activity between husband and wife 
was mandated by the LRA and monitored by commanders.69 
Women who refused sex were beaten. Men who refused were 
threatened by their commanders with punishment, and so few dis-
obeyed. !e purpose of intercourse was to reproduce, and half of 
the forced wives gave birth while in captivity.70 Wives who failed to 
conceive were given “medical treatment,” though it is unclear what 
this entailed.71 
FORCED MARRIAGE AS STRATEGY 
!e practice of forced marriages was a strategy designed and 
implemented by the LRA leadership; it was neither opportunistic 
behavior by individual soldiers, nor was it a widespread practice 
ignored by the commanders. !e LRA leaders orchestrated every 
stage of the girls’ experience, including their abduction, distribution 
as wives, and reproductive activities.72
When the LRA carried out its raids, it captured boys with-
out method; the only characteristic considered was the boy’s age.73 
On the other hand, the leadership strictly controlled the abduction 
of girls according to numerous specifications. Commanders docu-
mented the numbers of girls who were captured, escaped, and died, 
and these records were relayed to the LRA’s second-in-command, 
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Vincent Otti.74 He tracked how many new female abductees were 
needed to compensate for the losses and dictated the number of 
girls to be abducted. Following a raid, the field units communicat-
ed with their superiors via radio to inform them of the number of 
males and females abducted. 75 If the figures were adequate, the 
group returned to the LRA bases in Sudan. 
Upon returning to the Sudanese bases, women and girls were 
isolated for a period prior to distribution as wives by the most 
senior LRA leaders.76 !is responsibility lay with Kony him-
self, Otti, and select top-ranked o"cials in the position known as 
“BM,”77 who answered directly to Kony and Otti. Wives were allo-
cated according to the men’s status. Commanders and high-ranking 
fighters received five wives on average, while low-level fighters had 
one or two.78 Kony himself is believed to have married more than 
forty abducted females. Although in some instances marriages were 
arranged through a lottery system, distribution occurred primarily 
on the basis of the leaders’ placement. Commanders’ preferences 
were taken into account, and they could describe the age and ap-
pearance they desired for their wives.79 Intelligent, educated girls 
were especially coveted, because they could perform tasks for their 
husbands that involved writing or recording information. Once as-
signed to a man, girls were obligated to become his wife; refusal was 
punished by beating, rape, torture, or death.80
Given that the LRA leadership coordinated and executed 
forced marriages, the question is then why they invested in this 
strategy. Several explanations have been proposed that are insu"-
cient to explain the emergence of the institution of forced marriage, 
which I will now address in turn. 
!eory One: Girls were needed to perform women’s work and fill 
necessary combat and support roles. Girls undoubtedly fulfilled vital 
needs of the organization, and their value in this respect explains 
the LRA’s abduction of females for indoctrination into their group. 
However, this theory does not account for the commanders’ orders 
for women to marry and reproduce. One cannot simply ask why 
the presence of girls was valuable, but rather why the institution of 
forced marriage was worthwhile. 
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!eory Two: Forced marriages were implemented in order to re-
move the desire to rape non-combatants (what Wood terms “the substi-
tution argument”).81 Given that the rape of non-combatants is ab-
sent from the LRA’s repertoire of violence, one might be tempted to 
accept the substitution argument as a valid explanation for forced 
marriage. However, armed groups in many other conflicts neither 
systematically rape civilians nor support forced marriages (e.g., Sri 
Lanka and Israel/Palestine).82 It is therefore possible to avoid rape 
without establishing an alternative outlet for sex through forced 
marriages. Why, then, would the LRA build such a complex insti-
tution for the purpose of avoiding rape? !e substitution argument 
fails to su"ciently explain the policy of forced marriage. 
!eory !ree: Joseph Kony was perpetuating a hedonistic life-
style for himself in which he had authority, easy access to resources and 
the first choice of wives.83 As leader of a rebel group that terrorized 
northern Uganda, Kony certainly had a level of power and influ-
ence he would not otherwise possess. However, the personal ben-
efits Kony derived from the organization, such as his accumula-
tion of handpicked wives, cannot explain the implementation of 
forced marriage throughout his forces. !ere was a clear imbalance 
in the resources to which Kony had access; he married at least forty 
women, in contrast to the commanders’ five and the low-level fight-
ers’ one or two wives. If Kony’s personal benefit was driving the 
practice of forced marriage, then why would he allocate any wives 
to other soldiers instead of appropriating all the girls for himself? 
If the motivation for the policy of forced marriage was maintain-
ing the personal benefit Kony derived, then it would not have been 
worthwhile to institutionalize this program across the LRA. 
!eory Four: Existing cultural norms that supported forced mar-
riage were merely pushed into the context of conflict. One perspective 
claims that the LRA’s forced marriages evoke historical and cul-
tural customs in northern Uganda in which “marriage by capture” 
was not uncommon.84 “Girls are mostly taken to become ‘wives’ in 
much the same way as chiefs and war leaders in the past . . . In tak-
ing young women as ‘wives’, the LRA has systematically manipulat-
ed and corrupted certain existing conventions and moral norms.”85 
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However, the veracity of this claim is contested.86 Acholi culture 
prized marriages arranged through periods of courtship and pay-
ment of a bride price.87 Modernity has produced alternatives to 
traditional bride-wealth marriages, but these include Christian 
marriage, elopement, and single parenthood—not marriage by 
capture.88 
One can also discern plausible anecdotal evidence from exter-
nal reactions to forced marriage from outside the LRA to counter 
the marriage-by-capture theory. Acholi and Langi society do not 
recognize LRA forced marriages as legitimate; consent from the 
bride, bridegroom, and both sets of parents are required in order 
for the marriage to satisfy customary law.89 Some former LRA 
wives who reintegrate into their communities are shunned by their 
families or confronted with demands to abandon their children 
born in captivity. Many women are forced to participate in a cleans-
ing ceremony to rid themselves of guilt and experiences of rape and 
forced impregnation.90 !ese hostile reactions seem to challenge 
the notion that forced marriages were merely an extension of a cul-
turally accepted practice. 
Yet even if Allen and Schomerus’ argument is true, questions 
about the LRA’s systematic implementation of forced marriage still 
arise. Why did the LRA cultivate this cultural norm even while 
destroying others? !e LRA desired to cleanse Acholi society of 
its impurities, such as witchcraft and Westernization, and to create 
a new order.91 It therefore seems more likely that the LRA would 
seek to disrupt existing social conventions. And they did. For in-
stance, murders, mutilations, and disrespect for those killed would 
have been especially taboo among the Acholi. Ancestors are highly 
revered, and providing the dead with a proper burial was of the 
utmost importance—so much so that there are even burial rituals 
for the enemy.92 !e LRA wholly disregarded such cultural norms. 
Clearly an explanation beyond culture and tradition is necessary to 
account for the LRA’s promotion of forced marriage. An analogous 
phenomenon occurred through the LRA’s manipulation of tradi-
tional Acholi spirituality: 
Before the current conflict, these religious practices were already 
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playing important roles . . . !e LRA is firmly embedded in 
these local belief systems, even though they have been reshaped 
into a new spiritual order. On the other hand, drawing on these 
real beliefs serves a strategic rationality.93
!ough historical antecedents and cultural reference points 
could have contributed to forced marriage’s origins in the LRA, 
they alone cannot su"ciently explain its institutionalization. Like 
the LRA’s system of spirituality, the practice of forced marriage 
must have o#ered the rebels an additional advantage that perpetu-
ated its systematic implementation.
Explaining Forced Marriage in the LRA
!is section lays out a theory explaining forced marriage in 
the LRA based on the assumption that it o#ered value to the orga-
nization. In short, the marriage of abducted girls to LRA soldiers 
and commanders strengthened the e#ectiveness of the rebel group. 
Carlson and Mazurana put forth this argument, but they capture 
only half of the story.94 Forced marriage strengthened the LRA by 
two mechanisms: it acted as a compensation and reward system, 
and it created bonds among soldiers while fostering dependency 
on the LRA. Carlson and Mazurana discuss the former but neglect 
the latter. Forced marriage thus satisfied needs that emerged be-
cause of the environment in which the LRA operated—one lack-
ing material wealth or popular support—and so the political and 
economic context of the war and the emergence of forced marriage 
cannot be disentangled.
To a large extent, women were allotted to males as a form of 
compensation and reward. As one of several tools of control, mate-
rial rewards were promised to troops by LRA commanders upon 
military success.95 However, the organization was impoverished, 
and money and the spoils of village raids were rarely dispensed.96 
!e allocation of wives to male soldiers acted as a surrogate pay-
ment system in the absence of distributable material goods. Forced 
marriage functioned not only as a low-cost system of remuneration 
but also as a means of rewarding bravery and highlighting high sta-
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tus.97 !ose with higher rank were honored in part by their right 
to multiple wives, all of whom they also had the privilege of hand-
picking. Forced marriages thus incentivized bravery and loyalty and 
induced psychological benefits for the rebels by boosting their mo-
rale.98 
Although compensation is a critical feature of the purpose 
of forced marriage, it does not explain its presence entirely. Dur-
ing the war, for example, raiders stole 98 percent of the Acholi’s 
cattle, along with large numbers of goats, sheep, and poultry.99 !e 
thieves were primarily from the Karamajong tribes and the UPDF; 
the LRA were involved in this crime to a much lesser extent. 100 
It is curious that the LRA did not engage in more cattle raids as a 
means of compensating for their lack of significant resources. Per-
haps the explanation lies in their mobile structure and the logistical 
challenges of moving between the Ugandan bush and LRA camps 
in Sudan. However, since the LRA was already confronted with 
these challenges when transporting abducted persons and plunder 
from abandoned villages, this defense is unconvincing. 
!e LRA’s relative inattention to cattle raiding implies that 
the need for wealth, food and other resources was not the only mo-
tivation behind their repertoire of violence. If wives were distrib-
uted solely due to the absence of material goods, then it is peculiar 
that the rebels would bypass a lucrative opportunity like cattle raid-
ing. !is oddity highlights the fact that the LRA targeted girls for 
abduction and marriage for reasons beyond mere resource collec-
tion and distribution. !e use of women as compensation is insuf-
ficient by itself to explain the presence of forced marriage; some 
dimension of their humanity added value to the LRA. 
Indeed, women benefited the LRA because they created fam-
ilies. As a judgment from the Special Court for Sierra Leone high-
lighted, forced marriages are “intended to impose a forced conjugal 
association upon the victims rather than exercise an ownership in-
terest.”101 By creating families, the LRA forged bonds and fostered 
dependencies that helped keep together its force of abducted youth. 
Marriage increased the wives’ reliance on their husbands through 
two pathways. First, women were treated di"erently according to 
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the rank of their husbands, and so some women may have relied 
on their spouses for protection.102 Second, the birth and care of 
children reinforced wives’ dependence on their husbands for mate-
rial support.103 !e behavior of widowed forced wives illustrates 
this dynamic. !ough they were permitted to abstain from a sec-
ond marriage, widows rarely refused another husband because they 
perceived marriage as the only way to care for their children.104 
Children in Acholi society are greatly valued, and “childlessness is 
one of the most serious misfortunes imaginable.”105 !e LRA’s or-
der to reproduce capitalized on this cultural value. 
Families were also created through the adoption of young fe-
male abductees. Pre-pubescent girls were not forcibly married ini-
tially, but were instead assigned to families, instructed to call the 
commander “father,” and treated as domestic slaves.106 Sex with 
these girls was prohibited, but once they reached puberty, they 
transitioned to the role of the commanders’ wives.107
Forced marriage and the creation of family units thus helped 
glue together an armed force composed of abducted youth who 
otherwise had no allegiances to the LRA. Building webs of inter-
dependence was important for the LRA because it promoted loy-
alty to the group and minimized the likelihood of escape. Loyalty 
and unit cohesion was entirely constructed by the LRA, and forced 
marriage was a crucial tool to accomplish these ends. Other instru-
ments employed by the LRA will be discussed in the next section.
The Curious Absence of Extra-Marital Rape
!e LRA committed a litany of violent o"enses. LRA sol-
diers abducted children and forced them into combat and marriage. 
Commanders both coerced male soldiers to rape their forcibly mar-
ried wives and compelled women to give birth and raise children 
in captivity.108 !e rebels disfigured and mutilated civilians, mur-
dered others, and pillaged abandoned villages.109 Yet certain prac-
tices are noticeably absent from this repertoire of violence. LRA 
rebels did not rape civilians during village raids. Commanders did 
not indoctrinate newly abducted youth by pressuring them to gang 
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rape women and girls. And abducted girls were not raped outside of 
sanctioned forced marital relationships. 6.5 percent of never mar-
ried abducted females and 1.7 percent of non-abducted females 
were raped,110 compared to 93.5 percent of forced wives.111 !ese 
statistics, though imperfect estimates of the magnitude of violence, 
suggest that rape outside forced marriage may not have been alto-
gether absent but remained relatively infrequent compared to the 
rape of forced wives. 
!ough disheartening to admit, one would expect horrify-
ing acts of rape outside marriage to be included among the LRA’s 
multitude of crimes. All of the aforementioned motivations for the 
LRA’s violent targeting of civilians—purification of society, seek-
ing vengeance, spreading fear, undermining the government, etc.—
would also be achieved by raping non-combatants. Public gang 
rapes would have been particularly e"ective at accomplishing some 
of these goals. Indeed, the literature on sexual violence predicts the 
LRA would have raped more non-combatants and unmarried ab-
ducted girls than was observed. Scholars such as Dara Kay Cohen 
argue that gang rape is perpetrated in order to satisfy the internal 
socialization needs of an armed group. Cohen asserts that armed 
groups with low levels of internal cohesion use gang rape as a means 
of forging unity and compliance.112 !e quintessential group with 
little cohesion is one that forms its army through forced recruit-
ment, using methods such as abduction. Gang rape is valuable to 
such groups, because it induces a sense of shared responsibility for 
the crime, establishes allegiances between soldiers, and makes it 
more di#cult for abductees to abandon the army. Considering that 
the LRA was thoroughly reliant upon abduction for constructing 
its army, the LRA seems to exemplify the armed group that Cohen 
models.
Nevertheless, gang rape is not the only possible mechanism 
for achieving these ends, and the LRA obviated the need for gang 
rape by employing other socialization methods. Since these prac-
tices provided more benefits to the LRA and were less costly than 
rape, the leadership acted to curb rape by its forces. !e result was 
a blanket prohibition on rape by the LRA and the overall absence 
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of gang rape from its repertoire of violence.
Substitutes for Gang Rape in Socializing Abducted Combatants
Although the LRA’s repertoire of violence deviates from that 
predicted by Cohen, the organization was still vulnerable to the 
problems she identifies as facing groups with low internal cohe-
sion. Nevertheless, gang rape is not the only means of socializing 
an army, and the LRA adopted other methods to meet its social-
ization needs. !e primary tools the LRA utilized were material 
rewards (i.e., forced wives), political propaganda, spirituality, and 
brutal violence. Like gang rape, these four practices promoted co-
hesion within the units and loyalty to the LRA. Commanders em-
ployed them to indoctrinate newly acquired children into the army 
and control its rebel forces. 
Forced wives: As previously described, the LRA forced ab-
ducted females to marry male soldiers and commanders in order to 
maintain an army of forced recruits. !e LRA built loyalties within 
the group by creating families, which fostered inter-dependent re-
lationships among the forces. !e organization sought to reduce 
the likelihood that abductees would escape by compelling married 
couples to reproduce and raise children together. Having multiple 
wives also highlighted fighters’ status and bravery, which boosted 
troop morale.
Political propaganda: Despite mainstream media accounts to 
the contrary, the LRA had a political agenda that precipitated its 
insurgency. Commanders frequently used political propaganda to 
motivate their abductees, and this tactic was found to have been 
relatively e"ective at inducing loyalty to the LRA.113 One former 
soldier said, “When I was just abducted I was optimistic that we 
would win this war because the commanders kept on telling us 
that we would overthrow the government soon.”114 !ough po-
litical messages were neither the LRA’s primary nor most visible 
tool of control, surveys show that political propaganda was com-
municated to abductees at high levels on par with levels of spiritual 
rhetoric.115
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Spirituality: !e LRA’s spiritual ideology was critical to its 
indoctrination of abductees and maintenance of control over its 
forces. Spiritual practices were “a clear attempt to create new social 
bonds and loyalty based on a shared cosmology (as well as fear). 
Kony created a cult of mystery and spiritual power which few ab-
ductees or civilians question even now.”116 Most abductees partici-
pated in a spiritual initiation ceremony involving prayer rituals and 
anointment of local oil. !ere were numerous spiritual rules that 
restricted all facets of the soldiers’ behavior, including washing, eat-
ing, prayer, and sex. 
!e rule forbidding sexual activity outside of forced marriag-
es, for instance, reflected cultural norms against rape that were ex-
ploited for a strategic purpose. !e e"ect of this prohibition on ex-
tramarital sex and other rules and rituals was to provide structure 
for newly acquired abductees.117 It gave them a sense of control 
during a period of uncertainty and thus proved a critical element in 
their transition into the LRA. 
Kony was thought to possess considerable spiritual power, 
which greatly contributed to his e"ective control of his army. More-
over, the soldiers were persuaded that they were accountable to a 
higher power that could punish them in battle with death. Belief in 
a supernatural monitoring system with retributive capabilities was 
incredibly valuable to the LRA command hierarchy as it meant sol-
diers could be continuously observed by omniscient spirits.118 !e 
LRA was thus structured to create powerful incentives for compli-
ance. 
Brutal violence: !e LRA’s socialization tactic most similar to 
gang rape was the beatings and killings that they forced abductees 
to execute. A former abductee recalled:
!ey say they are removing the civilian type of life from you; 
they want to change you into a military person. So instead of 
giving me a gun, I was given a lock wire. !en we got some six 
people and I was told to use the lock wire to beat these people. 
And I had to do it, because if you don’t do it you are the next 
person.119 
!ese forced attacks occurred soon after children were cap-
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tured, and their function was manifold. !ey desensitized abduct-
ees to violence, broke down their resistance, and made it increas-
ingly di"cult for them to desert the LRA and return home, where 
the threat of punishment was palpable. A sizable minority of ab-
ductees was forced to kill or beat friends and family members.120 
Like gang rape, the collective commission of these crimes bred a 
sense of shared responsibility for the violent act. In this way, the 
forced perpetration of appalling acts of violence had a perceptible 
impact on the abductees’ loyalties and commitment to the LRA.
CONTROLLING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HOW THE LRA 
SUCCEEDED
Given that the LRA used methods other than gang rape to 
socialize its abducted combatants, it is necessary to turn to the 
question of how and why the LRA avoided this form of sexual vio-
lence. Like Cohen, Amelia Hoover Green interprets the presence 
and absence of sexual violence as the product of an armed group’s 
socialization methods. She contends that discipline alone cannot 
restrain violence. Rather, sustained controlled violence occurs when 
soldiers are persuaded to value controlled violence through politi-
cal programs institutionalized by their commanders.121 Hoover 
Green uses controlled violence to refer to “violence with a relatively 
narrow, consistent repertoire.”122 In other words, violence is con-
trolled in its form, and considering in so far the overall absence of 
rape outside forced marriage, the LRA’s practices of sexual violence 
would appear to exemplify this concept. 
Also in line with Hoover Green’s predictions, sexual violence 
and gang rape were suppressed through the commanders’ decisions 
and the institutions they created. As previously described, the LRA 
had a strong organizational structure and clear hierarchy of lead-
ership that made it possible for them to enforce these norms. For 
instance, a rare story of soldiers violating the directives on sexual 
behavior tells of Kony demoting all the o"cers in the Sinia Brigade 
for having sex with women in a village.123 However, the means by 
which the LRA commanders achieved this control over violence 
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di!ered from Hoover Green’s predictions. "e LRA’s political 
education programs were weak in comparison to its disciplinary 
systems, which Hoover Green suggested would lead to a widening 
repertoire of violence. "is prediction was not realized in the LRA. 
"e LRA’s political propaganda provided a narrative for the 
war’s purpose by rallying troops around the goal of overthrowing 
Museveni’s government. However, this failed to justify the LRA’s 
violence against civilians, which seems to be the area in which sol-
diers’ mindsets most needed adjustment. Furthermore, many ab-
ductees’ faith in the plausibility of this political outcome waned 
quickly. One former soldier said, “But after seeing what atrocities 
these rebels were doing, like killing many civilians, looting and 
continuous fighting without any success, I realized the rebels are 
wasting time and we’ll not overthrow the government.”124 "is 
statement and other similar comments cast doubt on the efficacy 
of the LRA’s political propaganda to imbue the war with a sense 
of purpose and modify natural instincts regarding violence against 
civilians. 
"e institution through which the LRA most powerfully 
shaped its forces’ behavior was its spiritual order. It established be-
havioral rules, valorized controlled violence, and framed the narra-
tive of the conflict violence as a purification of society. In Hoover 
Green’s language, the spiritual institutions were e!ective at chang-
ing soldiers’ habits and standard operating procedures.125 Yet it is 
not clear that this occurred by shaping soldiers’ preferences to cor-
respond with those of the commanders. 
"e LRA’s spiritual order acted as not only an institution to 
induce preferential behavior changes but also the LRA’s disciplin-
ary system. "e leadership was successful at controlling the army 
by instilling in its soldiers a fear of divine retribution for disobeying 
orders and established rules. It is conceivable that discipline was 
as e!ective, if not more so, as the spiritual institutions’ narrative 
elements at changing behavioral norms. In addition to its exten-
sive holy rules, key elements of the LRA’s spirituality were Kony’s 
perceived relationship with the spirits and the authority of super-
natural powers. "ese elements of control had leverage over troops 
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because they bred a fear of punishment. 
Hoover Green’s theory—“discipline-only” armies will not 
be successful in the long-term—is not substantiated by the LRA. 
She argues that external disincentives are frequently unenforce-
able; however, her reasoning for that claim is not applicable to the 
LRA. First, the problem of information asymmetry is irrelevant in 
this case, because punishment ostensibly came from an omniscient 
spiritual power. Second, the army is composed of abducted chil-
dren, and so there is no selection bias that could pre-dispose the 
army to violence. !ird, the punishment for being fearful in battle 
or disobeying orders was almost always death, and statements from 
former soldiers reinforce the intuition that death is a su"ciently 
strong punishment to alter behavior. Considering the powerful ef-
fect of discipline on soldiers’ behavior and the relative weakness of 
the LRA’s political and spiritual framing of the war, it is possible 
that discipline played the dominant role in controlling the LRA’s 
sexual violence.
Controlling Sexual Violence: Why
Given that the LRA embodies Hoover Green’s notion of con-
trolled violence, she would predict that its commanders regulated 
violence because they were incentivized to control their soldiers’ be-
havior. Hoover Green holds that groups dependent on non-com-
batants for information are more likely to control violence. Yet the 
LRA did not depend on non-combatants for intelligence. On the 
contrary, they hoped to prevent civilians from becoming govern-
ment informants. !e LRA would have probably benefitted from 
permitting more indiscriminate violence than was observed. !e 
mechanisms that Hoover Green predicts would incentivize army 
leaders to control violence are thus irrelevant to the LRA. 
Likewise, several additional reasons for why commanders 
might control sexual violence do not hold for the LRA.126 Al-
though LRA rebels hoped to overthrow the government, their vi-
cious acts of violence and desire for vengeance suggest they were 
not concerned about undermining public support for their future 
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rule. !ey were also untroubled by the need to create a comfortable 
environment to attract female recruits and undeterred by interna-
tional law. A multitude of practical, normative and strategic reasons 
fail to explain the LRA’s rationale for controlling sexual violence, 
which begs the question: what motivated the LRA to control vio-
lence?
!e LRA leadership restricted sexual crimes because gang 
rape was not instrumental to the LRA’s success. After being so-
cialized, troops are more likely to perpetrate wide repertoires of 
violence, even when not directed to commit violence.127 Leaders 
therefore must work to gain control over the violent groups they 
have created and prevent combatants from directing violence at 
their superiors. !is universal problem for armed groups was com-
pounded in the LRA by the practical challenge of garnering troop 
loyalty in a fragile army composed of involuntary soldiers and de-
void of material resources. Accordingly, the necessity of and empha-
sis on control may have been magnified in the LRA. !e leadership 
would have benefited from limiting violence to the extent possible 
without impinging on its political and military agenda. Hoover 
Green argues that sexual violence is the o"ense most likely to be 
“overproduced” in an armed group because it is one of the crimes 
most likely to occur for private, rather than strategic, purposes.128 
Hence, military commanders will aim to restrict those crimes. In 
other words, controlling the soldiers’ sexual violence was a critical 
means of exerting control over a potentially tenuous army. 
While cultural norms against rape were exploited for a stra-
tegic purpose, such conventions are not su#cient to explain the 
absence of this crime given that many other norms were not re-
spected. Why did the LRA respect the social taboo of rape while 
breaking others? In the case of the LRA, there were additional stra-
tegic reasons to select sexual violence for such targeted constraints.
!e mutilation of bodies was one social taboo repeatedly 
violated by the LRA, and bodily disfigurement was featured in the 
LRA’s repertoire of violence and used to socialize new combatants. 
I described above how acts of beating and murder triggered the 
same mental processes as gang rape (e.g., fear of returning home, a 
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sense of collective responsibility for violence, and desensitization to 
violence), which allowed them to be substituted for rape as a meth-
od of indoctrination. Mutilations could produce the same impact. 
In addition, they have an incredibly powerful psychological pull 
that rape does not generate as forcefully. !e violation of bodily in-
tegrity through gross disfigurement elicits the emotion of disgust. 
It is well established that disgust is a potent tool to incite people 
to vicious acts of violence in instances of mass murder, genocide, 
and ethnic cleansing.129 By disfiguring civilians and making them 
appear “disgusting,” the LRA dehumanized Acholi and Langi soci-
ety and stripped them of their moral value. Moral considerations 
and empathy therefore did not apply to them, and it would have 
been easier for soldiers to inflict incredible violence upon them. 
!e power of disgust to facilitate the commission of violence was 
thus a powerful incentive for the LRA to order the disfigurement 
of civilians, as well as beatings and killings, which involved a similar 
mutilation of the body. !ough rape undeniably involves the viola-
tion of the body and devaluation of the victim, it does not evoke 
the same intense feelings of revulsion as the aforementioned acts. 
In summary, gang rape was not necessary for the LRA’s rep-
ertoire of violence. Alternative socialization methods were just as 
e"ective at achieving the LRA’s practical needs. !ough it is debat-
able whether these other acts of violence, such as bodily mutilation, 
reaped additional benefits for the LRA that could not be gained 
through gang rape, it is fair to say that the LRA at a minimum did 
not lose anything by forbidding acts of rape. !is is especially true 
considering that soldiers’ sexual desires were ostensibly already sat-
isfied through the mandated sexual activities of their forced mar-
riages. Not only was gang rape unnecessary, but it may have also 
been counterproductive. A priority for the LRA was to control 
its troops, and a critical means of doing so was controlling their 
behavior, including their violence. Sexual violence was targeted 
for constraint in part because of cultural norms but also because 
rape is the crime most vulnerable to being perpetrated for private, 
rather than strategic reasons. Sexual activities within forced mar-
riages were structured, controlled by commanders, and sanctioned 
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for strategic reasons that benefited the organization. On the other 
hand, uncontrolled sexual activities, whether that of consensual sex 
between soldiers or the rape of civilians, could have escalated and 
threatened organizational control. !ey were therefore prohibited.
Theory of Forced Marriage without Extra-Marital Rape 
!e LRA’s repertoire of violence in northern Uganda presents 
an empirical puzzle: the rebels performed an array of brutal crimes 
against non-combatants, including systematically forcing abducted 
girls into marriage, but they committed no acts of rape beyond 
the non-consensual sex that occurred within these marriages. I 
described why this unexpected pattern of violence emerged, and 
now I o"er a theoretical framework for this descriptive analysis. An 
armed group will arrange forced marriages but refrain from other 
acts of rape, especially gang rape, when the following three circum-
stances coincide. 
!e armed group faces a strong need to control its troops and 
create internal loyalties. Groups likely to encounter this challenge most 
acutely will be those that forcibly recruit their troops. When combined 
with the two conditions outlined below, this problem will not lead 
to increased gang rape as predicted. Rather, it will cause command-
ers to restrict sexual violence except in its most controlled forms, 
such as forced marriages. Sexual activities in forced marriages 
will be promoted for the purpose of reproduction as they can be 
monitored and enforced, and they e"ectively bind soldiers together 
through inter-dependent relationships. 
Other elements in the armed group’s repertoire of violence can 
substitute for or build upon the psychological mechanisms through 
which gang rape benefits the armed group. Gang rape is not the sole 
tool available to armed groups to socialize its forces. If the organi-
zation utilizes another act of violence that produces similar e"ects 
to gang rape, then this practice will not be needed and commanders 
can prohibit it without damaging their operation. 
Cultural norms reject rape and support the importance of mar-
riage and children. Cultural references are important for orient-
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ing soldiers to new behavioral expectations. !ough these values 
hold true in most societies, they di"er in their relative importance. 
Armed groups in societies that strongly identify with this value set 
will be more likely to engage in forced marriage and reject rape if 
the two aforementioned conditions exist. 
Although this theory needs to be evaluated in light of other 
conflicts, initial research suggests that the Cambodian genocide 
and the rebellion in Algeria may provide additional support. !e 
Algerian rebel group Polisario recruits children from displaced per-
sons camps, arranges forced marriages to compensate for the loss 
of its members, and bans the use of birth control in these relation-
ships.130 !ese practices of forced marriage echo those observed in 
the LRA. In addition, rape is otherwise absent from the organiza-
tion’s repertoire of violence, and women are imprisoned for unsanc-
tioned sexual relations.
During the Cambodian genocide, the Khmer Rouge arranged 
forced marriages and severely punished those who had sexual ac-
tivities outside of marriage. Forced marriage “was intended as a 
method of obtaining control over people’s sexuality and ensuring 
that the reproductive function was managed by the state to pro-
duce more workers for the revolution. Sex and romance outside of 
marriage were forbidden, on pain of death.”131 An important dif-
ference between this regime and the LRA is that the primary vic-
tims of forced marriage in Cambodia were the civilians in Khmer 
Rouge labor camps rather than combatants. However, the conflicts 
still o"er a useful comparison, because the relationship between 
LRA commanders and their abducted troops has much in com-
mon with that of the Khmer Rouge and the civilians contained in 
camps and forced into labor. Further research is needed to assess 
whether these cases corroborate with the proposed theory.
CONCLUSIONS
!e international response to the LRA-induced crisis has 
been generally lukewarm but punctuated by periods of interest in 
the past decade. E"orts to quell the violence against civilians and 
41Journal of Politics & Society
defeat the rebels have tended to be unsuccessful and even outright 
counterproductive. Today the regional capacity and political will to 
fight the LRA is flagging, and so international support through the 
African Union, United Nations, and bilateral agreements is critical. 
!e United States federal government’s attention is currently on an 
upswing, which also triggers greater attention to the LRA among 
journalists, NGOs, human rights advocates, legal analysts, and the 
general public. !is moment thus presents a critical opportunity to 
learn from the LRA’s past and heed the policy implications to be 
gleaned from this analysis.
It is imperative to ask why the LRA’s repertoire of violence 
developed in order to understand how this society—one that com-
mitted gross atrocities on a mass scale—came into being and how 
it operates. !ere has been much uncertainty and disagreement in 
the international community over how to characterize this enemy. 
Examining the causes of the LRA’s violence o"ers valuable insights 
into the group’s operations, the purpose of its violence, and its strat-
egies for achieving its goals. !e LRA patterns of forced marriage 
highlight the depth of the leadership’s control and the extent to 
which a military hierarchy prevailed. !eir repertoire of violence 
suggests survival was a chief concern, and inducing loyalty a princi-
pal means of sustaining the organization. 
!ere is also an important need to disaggregate types of sex-
ual violence. Sexual slavery, gang rape, forced marriage, and impreg-
nation are di"erent crimes, and distinguishing them has relevant 
human implications. Women subjected to gang rape or imprisoned 
for sex do not have the same psychological, financial, and legal 
needs following the war as former forced wives. Even as these wives 
attempt to reconnect with their communities, they may potential-
ly have children or captor husbands who are seeking to continue 
the marriage.. Each crime necessitates di"erent reintegration pro-
grams for abducted women. When non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), governments, and the United Nations refer to LRA 
crimes as “sexual slavery” with no more detail into the subtleties 
of the o"ense, they lose important information about the victims’ 
experiences.132 Conflating these crimes and ignoring experiential 
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di!erences between sexual enslavement and forced marriage deval-
ues the complexity of the victims’ traumas and renders forced wives 
invisible in international law. 
Attaining this level of linguistic precision is unlikely in advo-
cacy circles, however, as it is not conducive to the NGO commu-
nity’s agenda. "e term “sexual slavery” is frequently used instead 
of “forced marriage” as if they were interchangeable, in part because 
of the stronger emotional response the former term triggers. "e 
concept of slavery demands action; it evokes images of the most 
inhumane, immoral treatment, which is magnified by the sexual 
element of the enslavement. Forced marriage, on the other hand, 
might be interpreted as a form of arranged marriage to a gener-
ally apathetic international audience. Sensationalizing the crime is 
a tool—a powerful and arguably necessary one—for motivating ac-
tion to stop it. 
"e need for faithful representations of LRA sexual vio-
lence is not an obsolete, academic problem; rather it continues to 
manifest in current portrayals of LRA violence in South Sudan, 
the DRC, and Central African Republic. Patterns of LRA sexual 
violence appear to have shifted since the war was exported from 
Uganda, but it is unclear how drastic this change was, as reports on 
recent LRA practices are inconsistent. Allen and his colleagues re-
fer to “reports of systematic rape” and write, “Whereas in northern 
Uganda there were tight restrictions on LRA combatants’ access 
to women for sexual purposes, these appear to have been largely 
set aside.”133 Elements of both continuity and divergence appear 
in NGO reports. Human Rights Watch suggests that abducted 
girls continue to be assigned to soldiers and commanders; but at 
the same time, the organization does not describe a marital compo-
nent to these relationships, and it says girls were publicly raped af-
ter being distributed to commanders.134 Another Human Rights 
Watch report asserts that women and girls were raped by the LRA 
in most attacks during the Christmas massacres in Congo.135 "e 
organization’s anecdotal evidence does not imply that rape of non-
abducted civilians is remarkably pervasive, but it suggests it occurs 
significantly more frequently than it had in Uganda. "e U.S. De-
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partment of State Human Rights reports do not help to clarify this 
matter, as they refer only broadly to the LRA’s perpetration of rape 
and sexual violence and their abduction of children for use as sex 
slaves, without specifying whether abducted women and girls were 
forced to marry and raise children with LRA soldiers.136
Understanding the LRA’s repertoire of sexual violence in the 
years since it has left Uganda and how the rebels have responded 
to their rising vulnerability could help elucidate unanswered ques-
tions in this paper. If gang rapes are now committed during village 
raids or abducted women are publicly raped by LRA command-
ers, this will have important implications for how we conceive of 
the causes and purpose of the LRA’s violence. However, given the 
current dearth of information, it is premature to make such conclu-
sions. Further research on the LRA’s most recent patterns of sexual 
violence is thus needed.
!e above analysis of the LRA’s behaviors could also help in-
form the goals and strategies of operations to defeat the organiza-
tion. Recognizing the complex, strategic causes of sexual violence 
in the LRA is a reminder that its practices of violence exist for rea-
sons beyond the personal desires of a single man. Joseph Kony’s 
vindictive mentality, political ambitions, and sexual fantasies do not 
drive this repertoire of sexual violence. Removing Kony from the 
organization might not end the institutions of violence he has cre-
ated, just as it may not destroy the LRA itself, nor would it end the 
Great Lakes’ conflicts. In fact, experience has shown that military 
interventions have often sparked increased LRA violence toward 
civilians, and so renewed counter-insurgency e"orts should bear 
this fact in mind and prioritize the protection of civilians. 
Another area that warrants further research is the behav-
iors of individual soldiers who either committed or refrained from 
sexual violence. !is paper has focused its analysis at the level of 
the armed group and examined decisions of the LRA leadership. 
However, my intention was not to deny agency to the lower-rank-
ing combatants and suggest they had no control over whether to 
engage in or abstain from such o"enses. !e role of the low-level, 
individual fighter in perpetrating acts of sexual violence is especial-
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ly interesting given that many of the captor husbands were them-
selves forcibly recruited into the LRA. !is dynamic is one that 
could be the subject of additional investigation.
Finally, further research should be directed at confirming 
whether other cases, such as the Cambodian genocide and Algerian 
rebellion, support the theory outlined in this paper. A comparative 
empirical evaluation of this proposal would elucidate whether the 
LRA’s repertoire of sexual violence is in fact an anomaly or reflects 
the need for a more flexible theory of armed group socialization 
practices that carefully distinguishes between forms of sexual vio-
lence.
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